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ABSTRACT
Providers of insurance used to have no other choice than to absorb the behavioral externalities of their
policy-holders. New technology coupled with the incentives of low-risk consumers has made it possible for
firms to price-discriminate on the basis of behavioral risk and thus internalize behavioral externalities.
While cost-internalization is generally a positive development, the introduction of behavioral tracking
technologies also introduces new economic and social costs. This paper explores the economic and moral
trade-offs of adopting behavioral tracking technologies in various insurance settings.
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1. INTRODUCTION: TWO TYPES OF EXTERNALITIES
Internalizing some cost X that is externalized by party A onto party B is a natural economic and
moral aim. From an economic standpoint, a negative externality is inefficiency because party A
is not bearing the costs of their activities and thus overproduces some activity (Pigou 2013).
From a moral standpoint, most externalities involve a harm or damage that is inflicted on some
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innocent party B that takes no part in the activity caused by party A.1 Therefore, it would be
more efficient and more conducive to justice if party A was made to bear the full costs of their
activities as doing so would properly incentivize party A to produce the optimal amount of some
activity and would eliminate or reduce the harm that party B suffers.
Overuse of particular commodities is commonly listed as the type of activity where cost-
internalization could help such as taxing CO2 emissions to reduce the carbon footprint or taxing
plastics to reduce microplastic prevalence in aquatic resources. What is notable about these
examples is that the resource being overproduced is either a commodity or the byproduct of a
commodity. But many other types of externalities do not involve commodities but behaviors.
Reckless driving, loud music, second hand smoke, public intoxication all constitute behaviors
that generally create negative externalities for others. As global population grows and cities
become denser, the effect of behavioral externalities increases in magnitude.
Traditionally, behavioral externalities deviate from resource externalities in that they cannot
be easily taxed or fined. It is straightforward to tax products or their production but it is not so
easy to tax risky social behavior such as reckless driving, public nuisances, or unsafe firearm
storage. Personal behavior can often be ephemeral, its risk or harm diffusely spread, and its
origin sometimes known only to the behavioral perpetrator. However, with the increasing
digitization of personal information, the advent of big data and artificial intelligence (AI), the
monitoring of personal and behavioral information is increasingly feasible.
Providers of many types of services, typically insurance services, used to have no other choice
than to absorb the behavioral externalities of their constituents or policy-holders. New tech-
nology coupled with the incentives of low-risk consumers has made it possible for both firms
and governments to price-discriminate on the basis of behavioral risk and thus internalize
behavioral externalities. The mechanism for this is as follows: providers of insurance responsible
for paying for the costs of externalized behavior will want to lower these costs by internalizing
them to individuals responsible for this behavior. To do so, they will need to distinguish between
those individuals bearing low-risk from those individuals bearing high-risk and price-discrim-
inate between them. To properly price-discriminate, they will need to gather personal and
behavioral information on everyone they are insuring. To gather this information, firms have
begun implementing behavioral tracking technologies, henceforth referred to as BTTs. Gathering
behavioral information can allow firms to properly price-discriminate and hence better inter-
nalize costs between low and high risk individuals. While cost-internalization is generally a
positive development, the introduction of BTTs also introduces new economic and social costs.
This paper explores the trade-offs of adopting BTTs in various socio-economic settings.
I begin by briefly reviewing the relevant economic literature on insurance markets and the
relevant social theory literature on privacy. Then, I define the methodology in which I analyze
the effectiveness of insurance schemes using four normative criteria. I then lay out the general
model of why organizations have an incentive to cost-internalize behavioral externalities using
BTTs and why prima facie this is a social and economic improvement. I then introduce the
distinction between insurance consumers that are privacy-lovers from those who are privacy-
indifferent. This new distinction complicates the initial economic analysis and makes it much
more ambiguous whether BTTs improve the insurance market according to our four normative
1Most, but not all. Some externalities are co-committed, e.g., traffic congestion.
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criteria. The remainder of the paper analyses the trade-offs of adopting BTTs in two different
insurance contexts using our normative criteria. The paper concludes with a summary of the
social and economic implications of adopting BTTs.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
People purchase insurance to trade a known quantity of small loses to safeguard a future state
from much larger losses. Ideally, insurance is intended to only protect against external risks that
the agent faces, since the agent cannot control those kinds of risks. In reality, the insurable
individuals themselves often play a significant role in determining their overall risk level. For
example, people can drive cautiously or recklessly, they can eat healthily or poorly, they can
exercise, or be lethargic, etc. These choices have significant implications for a person’s overall
risk-level and increase their probability for trigging an insurable event for automobile, medical,
and life insurance. An individual’s risk-level across these parameters has traditionally been
unknown to insurance firms (Rothschild – Stiglitz 1978). Accordingly, the literature on insur-
ance has typically divided insured populations into two groups: low-risk and high-risk. A
dilemma that insurance companies face is how to price insurance policies knowing that in-
dividuals possess diverse risk profiles. Given the uncertainties that insurance firms face when
selling policies to individuals of different risk-profiles, economists have offered competing ac-
counts on whether the insurance market finds equilibrium and the properties that such an
equilibrium would possess.
In the past several decades two competing views on insurance markets have emerged. The
first view, originally articulated by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1978), held that competitive insur-
ance markets were susceptible to either (a) having no market equilibrium or (b) having a
separating equilibrium in which members of both groups (low-risk individuals and high-risk
individuals) are only partially insured. The problem according to this group of theorists is that
“the presence of the high-risk individuals exerts a negative externality on the low-risk in-
dividuals”, making the market less efficient than it otherwise would be (Rothschild and Stiglitz
1978: 638). Under this account, the problem is one of asymmetric information, where in-
dividuals have relatively more information about their own risk-profiles then insurance com-
panies do. One assumption of the Rothschild and Stiglitz model is that high-risk individuals are
more likely to purchase insurance in the first place because they are more likely to benefit from
coverage, while low-risk individuals are less likely to purchase insurance as they are less likely to
benefit from coverage. Knowing this, insurance companies are inclined to offer a menu of
policies that charge prices at higher rates for individuals seeking more coverage and lower prices
to individuals seeking less overall coverage (Rothschild – Stiglitz 1978; Spence 1978; Wilson
1976). The relative size of low risk to high risk individuals determines the extent to which no
equilibrium is obtained or a separating equilibrium is obtained (Rothschild – Stiglitz 1978).
In opposition to the Rothschild–Stiglitz view, another conception has emerged that chal-
lenges the underlying assumptions of the original model. De Meza and Webb (2001) contend
that individuals do not generally have identical risk preferences but instead argue that “cautious
people are not only more inclined to buy insurance but also put more effort into limiting risk
exposure, compared to individuals of a more reckless disposition” (De Meza –Webb 2001: 250).
According to this view, as low risk-individuals enter the insurance market, the cost of insurance
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is driven down overtime due to market competition. As the price of insurance falls, high-risk
individuals are now induced to enter the insurance market. The result is that low-risk in-
dividuals subsidize high risk individuals in pooling equilibria. Ultimately, “risk-tolerant in-
dividuals take few precautions and are disinclined to insure, but they are drawn into a pooling
equilibrium by the low premiums created by the presence of safer, more risk-averse types” (De
Meza – Webb 2001: 249).
While the Rothschild–Stiglitz and Meza–Webb conceptions of the insurance market are
strikingly different, they both hold that uncertainties in distinguishing between high and low risk
individuals culminate in sub-optimal distribution of insurance holdings. Under the Rothschild–
Stiglitz Model, equilibrium is either impossible or a separating equilibrium results in only partial
coverages where low-risk individuals subsidize high-risk individuals. In the Meza and Webb
Model, the presence of lower premiums due to low-risk types draws in high-risk individuals to
become insured, which results in a partial-pooling equilibrium where again low-risk individuals
subsidize high risk individuals. The models disagree about the level of coverage obtained by the
two groups, but they both agree that informational uncertainties generate a subsidy from low-
risk to high-risk individuals.
The emergence of behavioral tracking technologies (BTTs) can considerably diminish the
informational asymmetries that cause these sub-optimal economic consequences. BTTs can be
used by insurers to paint a comprehensive portrait of each insured individual’s risk level. Our
medical records are in possession by clinics and hospitals, our grocery purchases are known by
credit card companies, and our lifestyle habits are knowable by online search firms, e-commerce
organizations, and cell-phone companies. This information could reveal whether our dietary
habits are healthy, how much alcohol we consume, whether we get enough exercise and ulti-
mately how long we are expected to live. Were this information made available to insurance
companies it could provide a very accurate and personalized assessment of an individual’s level
of behavioral risk.
While economists would likely see BTTs as offering considerable economic improvements in
the insurance market, some social theorists are increasingly wary of the cultural risk that big data
and artificial intelligence pose to society at large. The concerns that these social theorists raise
are also applicable to BTTs. A relatively straightforward concern is that the presence of
behavioral tracking technology means that it becomes possible for private firms to continuously
monitor and surveil their customers. In particular, Zuboff identifies the emergence of a “new
universal architecture. . . a ubiquitous networked institutional regime that records, modifies, and
commodifies everyday experience from toasters to bodies, communication to thought, all with a
view to establishing new pathways to monetization and profit” (Zuboff 2015: 81). This network
of behavioral tracking technology coupled with the power of artificial intelligence could generate
the perverse consequence that firms will know “far more about its populations [of customers]
than they know about themselves” (Zuboff 2015: 83). The upshot for consumers is that com-
panies are now better situated to price discriminate against them by using the very information
that consumers voluntarily surrender. Newman argues that tracking technologies in online
marketing enables the firm to identify each customer’s unique pain point and create a custom
price for each individual (Newman 2014). Such a setup allows firms to extract virtually all of the
gains from trade thereby minimizing consumer surplus. In section six I discuss how a similar
argument may be levied at BTTs which reduces the social subsidy function of insurance and
potentially price individuals out of the insurance market.
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A third major concern for social theorists is the dissolution of both privacy norms and
privacy rights. Historically, threats to privacy were a byproduct of government overreach. The
introduction of tracking technologies has created a new paradigm in which “public and private
surveillance are simply related parts of the same problem, rather than wholly discrete” (Richards
2013: 1935). The mere existence of new information generated by tracking technology creates an
increased privacy risk as the new data could be stolen, compromised, or disclosed to other
parties for purposes beyond its original use. This information would be highly prized by
marketers, transportation agencies, ride-sharing firms, law enforcement, and criminals. Law
enforcement are already taking advantage of similar private databases for investigative purposes,
most notably in the case where genetic data from the company GEDmatch was used to catch the
Golden State Killer (Guerrini et al. 2018). Using the powers of legislation, regulation, or through
juridical means, government entities have the tools necessary to co-opt and use this data for
their own purposes. The social consequence is that “individuals are increasingly monitored by
an overlapping and entangled assemblage of government and corporate watchers” (Richards
2013: 1935).
3. METHODOLOGY
From the standpoint of traditional economic analysis, the introduction of BTTs to the insurance
market would be a welcome innovation as it would allow insurers to properly distinguish be-
tween low and high-risk individuals who will have marked efficiency improvements as I will
discuss in section four and five. However, social theorists such as Richards (2013), Newman
(2014), and Zuboff (2015) have identified certain disconcerting features of an increasingly
networked world. In particular, they point out how BTTs and other similar “innovations” will
result in a markedly less private world and one saturated by intrusive artificial intelligence.
Economists and social theorists have noticeably different visions of a future of behavioral
tracking technologies. In what follows I hope to reconcile these two differing visions by
exploring the trade-offs that adoption of BTTs in the broader insurance market would bring
about. The aim is to obtain a more balanced sense of the social and economic advantages and
disadvantages of BTTs.
To determine the various trade-offs of BTTs in the insurance domain I use four traditional
normative criteria: economic efficiency, incentives, rewards, and social risk. I give a brief account
of each of the criteria in turn.
1. Economic efficiency is measured by the size of the social surplus. Efficiency is improved if the
total surplus is increased and is reduced if the total surplus decreases. The primary mech-
anism through which BTTs improve efficiency is by better internalizing costs which in turn
results in a separating equilibrium and thus causes improved purchasing efficiency by both
high and low risk individuals. However, as we will see this will be complicated by the privacy
preferences of consumers.
2. Incentives are improved if individuals are better incentivized to decrease socially risky or
harmful behavior. BTTs purportedly improve incentives by better internalizing insurance
costs based on an individual’s behavior.
3. Rewards/punishments are improved if individuals are rewarded for socially beneficial
behavior and punished for socially costly behavior. However, individuals could also be
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rewarded or punished for having particular preferences, which is a detriment to both effi-
ciency and individual liberty. Thus, we will also be analyzing whether rewards and pun-
ishments using BTTs go beyond their intended purview.
4. The social risk category is a catch-all for concerns that are larger than the welfare of the
individuals in the identified groups. That is, risks that cannot be situated within an in-
dividual’s utility function. Notable examples include fundamental rights, such as the right to
privacy, or the right to health insurance, or even issues of social stability, and harmony.
Next, I lay out the general model of cost-internalizing behavioral externalities.
4. THE GENERAL MODEL OF COST-INTERNALIZING BEHAVIORAL
EXTERNALITIES
Every insurer knows that the policy-holders covered under their plans pose varying degrees of
behavioral risk.2 Assume that everyone an insurer covers could either be categorized in a low-
risk or a high-risk group. If insurers do not distinguish between people based on risk levels, it
means that they have to aggregate rates across risk groups, meaning that everyone gets the same
price for the same policy regardless of their risk level. This results in a situation where the low-
risk customers are essentially subsidizing the policies of the high-risk customers. There are four
problems with this, two economic and two moral.
The economic problems include deadweight loss and adverse selection. For a low-risk
customer, the price of the policies might be so high that they are discouraged from purchasing a
policy. This means a transaction that would have been beneficial to both parties is foregone, i.e.,
there is deadweight loss. There is not only too little of the “right” kind of demand, but also too
much of the “wrong” kind of demand, namely too many high-risk individuals will purchase this
policy and thus the balance of insurance payouts to these individuals will exceed the costs that
these individuals are paying in to the system. For the insurer, having to aggregate across risk
groups would mean a higher chance of losing the business of low-risk customers and a higher
chance of losing money on providing disproportionately cheap insurance policies to high-risk
customers. These effects decrease the stability of the insurance market in the long run
(Rothschild – Stiglitz 1978).
The moral issues are two-fold: low behavioral risk consumers are priced out of the market
and high behavioral risk customer’s free-ride on low behavioral risk customers. First, suppose a
person decides to become uninsured because the market price has become too high. If bad luck
strikes, this uninsured individual is now wholly responsible for footing the bill, and it is because
they were priced out of the market by people taking on higher risks, a rather perverse result.
Second, if a person in the low-risk category decides to purchase a policy, it means that they are
paying more so that people who have riskier behaviors pay less, which unfairly punishes low-risk
individuals.3
2I am only concerned about risk that is attributable to the behavior of the agents being insured. In saying this, I am not
precluding these risk considerations from an insurer’s calculus. The model described here does not depend on ignoring
these features; it just says nothing about them at all.
3This means that high-risk customers are free-riding on low-risk customers.
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So, it would be preferable if we could distinguish between low-risk and high-risk customers
so that insurers can charge rates on the basis of relative behavioral risk. The adoption of BTTs
enables insurers to accurately distinguish between the two groups. BTTs allow the insurance
company to charge lower prices to lower risk customers and higher prices to higher risk cus-
tomers, which better internalizes costs. Economically, this gets us closer to the Pareto frontier,
though interestingly it is not a Pareto improvement from the original circumstance.4 This is
simply because one party, the high-risk group, is now having to pay more to cover the insurance
for that risk. From the perspective of consumer advocates, it would generally count against a
practice if it moved from charging a given individual a lesser price to a higher price for the same
service, but in this case, it counts in its favor. Under a system where an individual’s payment is
based on the aggregate risk profile of a group, that individual has little incentive to reduce their
own level of risk, and in fact they might have an incentive to increase their level of risk, especially
if it comes with a private reward that exceeds the expected private cost. By contrast, if the price
of insurance goes down with low-risk behavior and goes up with high-risk behavior, then it
creates an incentive for the insured to partake in less risky behaviors. One of the economic
advantages of behavioral price-discrimination is that it creates an incentive to reduce social risk.
One of the moral advantages of behavioral price discrimination is that it means individuals
causing more social risk pay a higher cost for doing so, while individuals causing less social risk
pay a lower cost (Dworkin 1981). From the standpoint of making individuals accountable for
their own risks and reducing the costs of those risks to others, this is a moral improvement as it
rewards those who decrease social risk and punishes those who increase it.
All considered then, internalizing behavioral externalities reduces social costs, decreases the
possibility that adverse selection bankrupts insurance companies, optimizes rewards by making
people pay in proportion to the level of behavioral risk they pose to society, and encourages
personal responsibility. These are all positive developments. From the preliminary analysis, this
looks like a win-win-win. We now turn to take a look at how this is playing out in the car
insurance market.
5. COST-INTERNALIZATION OF RISKY DRIVING IN CAR INSURANCE
Traditionally, car insurers had limited means to price-discriminate between safe and risky
drivers, they typically had to rely on using historical data or statistical demographic com-
monalities. The introduction of BTTs, specifically “telematic devices,” have enabled car insurers
to collect real-time data on the driving patterns of their policyholders (Guillen 2018). These
devices are designed to track a number of driving behaviors, including but not limited to: how
often a person drives, how “hard” a person breaks, how fast a person drives, seat belt usage, lane
changes, and vehicle location (Husnjak et al. 2015). The use of this data allows car insurance
companies to determine the level of risky behavior that a driver is engaged in and then adjust
insurance rates accordingly.
Drivers agree to this under the promise of lower car insurance rates for demonstrating safe
driving behavior. Interestingly, this works as a price-discrimination method even if risky drivers
4One can move toward the Pareto frontier, without that movement being a Pareto improvement (Buchanan and Tullock
1965).
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choose not to participate in the program. If driver’s self-select participation based on their own
assessment of how well they drive, then safe drivers are more likely to opt into the program and
risky drivers are more likely to opt out. Insurance companies are aware that this self-selection
may occur and then need only monitor and adjust their default car insurance rates at levels for
insuring riskier drivers and then can incentivize participation in the program for the prospect of
either temporary or permanent rate reductions. As knowledge of these programs become more
widespread, it becomes more likely that drivers who opt out of the telematic device program are
risky drivers, while those who opt-in are revealed to be either risky or safe-drivers based on the
data obtained from the device. This gives the insurer the information they need to accurately
price customers. Over the long run, as adoption of these telematic devices becomes the norm,
insurers will be able to provide personal rates corresponding to the precise level of behavioral
risk that the customer poses.
If the general model is accurate, then using our established normative criteria we should
expect the following implications: (1) a separating equilibrium that efficiently internalizes costs,
(2) low-risk individuals are rewarded with lower insurance premiums, (3) high-risk drivers are
punished with higher insurance premiums, (4) an incentive for high-risk individuals to adopt
low-risk behavior, and (5) fewer car accidents in the long run. If the model is an accurate
representation of what will happen in the car insurance marketplace, the result is over-
whelmingly positive. Yet, this analysis may fail to capture the long-term costs. We have thus far
assumed that consumers are completely indifferent to the privacy concerns that BTTs pose. In
the next section, we show how the introduction of differential privacy preferences complicates
this analysis.
6. RISKS FROM COST-INTERNALIZATION OF BEHAVIORAL EXTERNALITIES
IN A COMPETITIVE MARKET
Historically, consumers used to only have two options when it came to insuring themselves
against some risk, either buy insurance (at some level) or don’t buy insurance. In the previous
two sections we assumed that consumers would generally stay with their insurance plan and that
the only difference would be whether they opt-in or opt-out of the behavioral tracking program.
Of course people sometimes do choose to be uninsured when they perceive that the cost of the
program exceeds the expected value of the risk. With the advent of BTTs, such as the previously
mentioned telematic devices, consumers now have three options: (1) opt-in to the insurer’s
behavioral tracking program to obtain a lower insurance rate, (2) purchase insurance but opt-
out of the insurer’s behavioral tracking program to preserve privacy and pay a higher insurance
rate, or (3) decline insurance altogether. I use the following designations to refer to the respective
options: “Insured þ Opt-In”, “Insured þ Opt-Out”, “Uninsured”. So, given these three options
how will consumers choose?
Our prior model assumed that there were only two relevant groups, people who posed low
risks and those who posed high risks. However, we can plausibly assume another relevant
dimension of consumer preference; those who are indifferent to privacy loss and those who bear
a utility loss when they lose privacy in some domain. The former group we can call privacy
indifferent, while the latter are privacy lovers. Thus, for any particular cost-internalizing
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technology or method that creates a privacy risk, there are actually four relevant consumer
groups. See Table 1.
The level of risk and the preferences of the participants will determine their behavior. As we
know from our discussion in sections four and five, Group A will adopt the behavioral tracking
technology because they will receive a lower insurance premium than if they were pooled with
the high risk group. However, this is the only group of consumers where we can be confident
what all of its members will do. For the members in each of the other groups, their behavior does
not clearly cleave in a single direction, but will depend on the specific details of each individual’s
utility function. However, we can provide the general behavioral contours for the consumers in
each group. Participants of Group B would have insurance absent the existence of the behavioral
tracking technology. However, the introduction of this technology means that the increased risk
that this group poses makes their premiums much higher than they were previously. The
consequence is that some consumers in Group B will likely leave the insurance market alto-
gether. The remaining members of Group B value having insurance even given the higher
premiums. Thus the remaining members of Group B will remain insured but will initially opt-
out of the BTT program. In the long run, members of this sub-group will have an incentive to
make behavioral changes to decrease their level of risk.
Members of Group C are low-risk privacy lovers which puts them in the unfortunate po-
sition of having to sacrifice either privacy, cost, or insurance. They can only opt-in to the
behavioral tracking program at the expense of their preference for privacy. Some members will
take this route, meaning that they receive a premium discount but also suffer a utility loss from
decreased privacy. For the other members of Group C, those who value a high degree of privacy,
they have a difficult choice. If they choose “Insured þ Opt-Out”, they will be pooled with high-
risk individuals and have to pay significantly higher premiums than they currently pay. If they
choose “Uninsured” then in the unlikely event that they have an accident, they will be un-
protected. None of these options looks particularly attractive from the standpoint of a low-risk
privacy lover. Without knowing the specific utility functions of Group C members, it is difficult
to tell where they predominantly fall, but it is likely that some members of group C will choose
each of the three options. Interestingly, if Meza and Webb’s claims about low-risk individuals
are accurate, then we will expect a high number of them to remain insured even if they opt-out
of behavioral tracking programs (De Meza – Webb 2001). The consequence would be that there
would still be a significant pooling effect between high-risk and privacy loving individuals. If on
the other hand, Rothschild and Stiglitz claims about low-risk individuals are accurate, then
members of Group C will tend to exit insurance altogether and the separating equilibrium will
be maintained.
Table 1. Types of insurance consumers
Low risk High risk
Privacy indifferent Group A: (Low risk, Privacy Indifferent) Group B: (High Risk, Privacy Indifferent)
Privacy lovers Group C: (Low Risk, Privacy Lovers) Group D: (High Risk Privacy Lovers)
Source: Author.
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Members of Group D will have no incentive to choose “Insured þ Opt-in”, since this would
only increase their insurance costs. Thus, given that their insurance costs will increase no matter
what, many members of group D will leave the insurance market altogether. Only some risk-
averse members of group D will choose “Insured þ Opt-Out” and in the long run will have an
incentive to change their risky behavior.
In Table 2 I have outlined the general contours of purchasing decisions of members in
particular groups. We know that Group A will universally choose “Insured þ Opt-In”. For the
other groups we know they will largely choose between “Insured þ Opt-Out” or “Uninsured”.
Group C is the only group whose consumers may choose any one of the options. We can be
fairly confident of the economic contours of the purchasing decisions as outlined in Table 2.
What is less clear is (a) how many individuals belong to each group and (b) what are the
distributional breakdowns of the choices within each group. These two questions require
empirical research.
Given these decisions to purchase insurance, what is the consequence for the desiderata?
Group A opts in to the behavioral tracking system and hence the cost based on their risk will be
properly internalized based on the behavioral tracking data. Additionally, because they are being
monitored, they will have an incentive to maintain low risk to ensure they continue to qualify for
lower premiums. The upshot is they are rewarded for their low levels of risk.
Group B members will choose not to participate in the behavioral tracking program due to
their known high levels of risk. Insurance firms know that members from Group B will self-
select out of the behavioral tracking program and hence charge higher rates to those individuals
opting out, thus internalizing the cost of riskier behavior. The insurance rates for people who
choose “Insured þ Opt-Out” will therefore be higher than they were before the introduction of
the behavioral tracking program. Due to these higher rates, some members of group B may
decline insurance altogether since the marginal price increase may make insurance too costly for
them. This is an improvement from the standpoint of economic efficiency, but shortly I discuss
why this may actually be a sub-optimal social result. The consequence for Group B is that cost is
properly internalized, that they have an incentive to decrease risk (since they qualify for lower
premiums at that point) and they are punished for their high risk behavior by having to pay a
higher premium until they are able to lower their risk.
Table 2. Behavior of consumers in different groups
Insured þ Opt-In Insured þ Opt-Out Uninsured
Group A (Low risk, Privacy
Indifferent)
All Group A consumers – –
Group B (High Risk, Privacy
Indifferent)
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Members of Group C will choose any of the three alternatives depending on the specific details
of their utility functions. The upshot however is that in any case, a member of Group C will likely
suffer relative to their original situation prior to the adoption of behavioral tracking programs by
the insurance company. If a member from Group C adopts the program, they will gain a premium
reduction but suffer a privacy loss. If they choose to remain insured but opt out of the behavioral
tracking program then they will be pooled into the high-risk group and pay more for the same
coverage, despite actually being a low-risk group. Finally, they may choose to go uninsured alto-
gether because the increased cost will not be worth it given their low risk. However, this is a
perverse result because if they do suffer an accident, they will be uninsured. The consequence is that
low-risk privacy lovers are punished for their privacy loving preferences. Finally, members of Group
D will either remain insured but opt out of the program or decide to go uninsured altogether.
Incidentally, members of Group D are correctly pooled and so their costs are properly internalized.
So what is the consequence of the insurance market adopting technologies for behavioral
tracking? Without knowing the size of the respective groups and the actual utility functions of
most consumers within each group, it is hard to determine whether this is an actual Pareto-
improvement. What is apparent is that when we factor in consumer preferences for privacy,
there are considerably greater trade-offs than the model originally implied.
The upshot is that for individuals who are willing to part with their privacy, the costs of their
actions better represent their risks. This is a victory for cost-internalization, but it comes at the
expense of cost-externalization for those in low-risk groups who are unwilling to accept privacy
loss. Whether cost internalization exceeds cost externalization depends both on the size of
Group A relative to the size of Group C, as well as the average savings (or loss) for each group.
Overall, groups A and B have better incentives than they did previously, while incentives for
groups C and D have not gotten any worse.
The final desiderata are social risk. As Rothschild and Stiglitz (1978) originally noted, the
presence of high and low risk groups makes it possible that there is no stable equilibria, which of
course is sub-optimal for the insurance market in general. The introduction of behavioral
tracking allows for an equilibria to be established which likely reduces volatility in the insurance
markets. This is an improvement from the prior situation, however, there is also likely to be an
increased number of uninsured individuals from groups C, B, and D. Traditional economic
analysis would regard an increased rate of uninsured individuals in groups B and D as being
efficient. This is because the expected value of their insurance policies exceeds the policy’s costs.
Only the increased uninsured rate of Group C would be viewed as market inefficiency. However,
the conclusions of the traditional economic analysis rest on two problematic assumptions: (1)
that the individuals in question have properly assessed their relative levels of risk and utility, (2)
that there are well-functioning credits markets for those with inadequate levels of income to
purchase insurance. Behavioral irrationality and wealth effects can distort an agent’s purchasing
decisions from the optimum. The agent’s decision not to purchase insurance may more likely be
the result of inadequate knowledge, insufficient savings, and disregard of risks posed to other
family members (e.g., the loss of household income). Furthermore, in many developed countries
there is increased social concern about the plight of the uninsured, most notably in the case of
health insurance (Mckee et al. 2013). Possessing health insurance is increasingly being regarded
as a fundamental right or at-least a social imperative. Given both the considerations of economic
uncertainty and the social imperatives, the increase of uninsured individuals in groups B and D
may be less socially optimal than originally implied.
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Given all of the considered factors, how does behavioral tracking of social risk compare to
the previous system where there was no behavioral tracking but more cost-externalization?
Table 3 compares the positive and negative changes that the introduction of BTTs has on a
competitive insurance market.
7. RISKS FROM COST-INTERNALIZATION OF BEHAVIORAL EXTERNALITIES
IN A COMPETITIVE MARKET WITH A UNIVERSAL MANDATE
When individuals are allowed to opt-out of BTT, the result is a partially pooling equilibrium
with the negative consequences being significant inefficiencies for members of Group C, as well
as an increase in the number of uninsured individuals from groups B, C, and D. One potentially
effective solution to both of these problems involves instituting a Universal Opt-In Insurance
Mandate. According to such a mandate, every individual has to be insured and is required to
participate in the BTT program. Such a solution essentially collapses groups A and C together
into a single low-risk group and groups B and D together into a high-risk group.
Under a Universal Opt-in Insurance Mandate all individuals are required to participate in
the behavioral tracking program, which means that insurers know the behavioral risk posed by
each individual. Such a mandate has the advantage of cleaving low and high-risk groups into a
perfectly separating equilibrium and results in cost-internalization, robust incentives, and fair
rewards/punishments. Such a mandate might make sense in the context of certain forms of
insurance, notably, liability insurance and health insurance.
Nevertheless, such a universal mandate comes with considerable trade-offs. First, Group C
and Group D still suffer utility losses as a consequence of their privacy loving preferences being
Table 3. The balance sheet in a competitive market
Dimension Positive changes Negative changes
Efficiency Cost-internalization for Group A, Group B,
and Group D.
Group C Costs: either (1) privacy loss for
those who choose “Insured þ Opt-In,”
(2) cost-externalization for those who
choose “Insured þ Opt-Out,” (3)
increased risk for members who choose
“Uninsured”.
Incentives Group A and B and members of C that opt-
in to the Program, have better Incentives.
–
Reward/punishment Group A is rewarded for reducing social
risk Group B and Group D is punished for
increasing social risk.
Group C is punished for privacy loving
preferences.
Social risk Decreased risk volatility in the insurance
market (as a consequence from higher risk
group internalization).
An increased number of uninsured
individuals from groups B, C, and D
Source: Author.
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ignored. Furthermore, while the social risk of the uninsured has been eliminated, another social
risk has taken its place; the violation of privacy rights. Requiring individuals to opt-in is a rights
violation in this case because their consent is completely undermined, individuals cannot opt-
out of being behaviorally tracked.5
Governments differ from private organizations in that they have the authority to alter the
legal institutions and are known to do so in order to implement and maintain large scale
programs. Given that the government has the unique power to alter the rules of the game, there
may be a legitimate concern that governments may facilitate the program for the express
purpose of making legal cost-internalization programs that undermine privacy rights. For
example, if behavioral cost-internalization takes place in the context of socialized healthcare,
governments could give themselves the legal power to review a person’s credit card data for the
purpose of evaluating their dietary habits to determine the size of that person’s health insurance
premiums. Such shrinking of legal rules would probably not happen all at once, but may happen
through a cumulative process of scope creep.
The increasing role of government involvement in healthcare may result in an increasing role
of government involvement in the monitoring of citizens’ behavioral health choices. This would
be morally problematic for reasons beyond privacy. Behavioral health choices comprise a sig-
nificant aspect of our personal lives. Religious and moral beliefs such as decisions to be vege-
tarian, vegan, or kosher may prevent an individual from eating a “balanced diet.” Many people
get enormous joy and fulfillment from risky recreational activities such as mountain-climbing,
boxing, motorcycle riding, base jumping, hang gliding, boating, and cave diving, yet all of these
involve considerable personal risk. Would these highly personal dietary and recreational be-
haviors count against one’s health premium in a hypothetical future government program? The
upshot of these considerations is that a universal opt-in mandate poses a serious threat to
Table 4. The balance sheet of a competitive market with a universal opt-in insurance mandate
Dimension Positive changes Negative changes
Efficiency Groups A, B, C, and D costs are fully
internalized.
Group C and Group D suffer utility losses
from privacy costs.
Incentives Groups A and C are incentivized to
maintain low risk.
–
Groups B and D are incentivized to
decrease risk.
Reward/punishment Groups A and C are rewarded for low risk. –
Groups B and D are punished for high risk.
Social risk All groups are fully insured. Systemic violation of privacy rights and
possible threat to civil liberties.
Source: Author.
5For an articulation of how lack of consent undermines rights, see Korsgaard (1996).
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privacy rights and perhaps undermines civil liberties by creating a situation in which the state
monitors citizens’ behavioral activities in an intrusive and patronizing manner.6 Table 4 com-
pares the positive and negative changes from a Universal Opt-in Insurance Mandate.
8. CONCLUSION
Internalizing behavioral externalities is a tempting approach to alleviating social costs, as it
unites the goal of economic efficiency with a sense of responsibilitarian justice. Yet, we have seen
that the introduction of behavioral tracking technologies does not result in a straightforward
separating equilibrium between low and high risk individuals. The advantage of BTTs is that
they make possible the creation of a custom price, unique to the behavioral risks posed by each
individual consumer. The problem is that the monitoring required to create a unique price
necessarily creates a privacy concern. The consequence is that there is a pooling effect between
privacy lovers and high risk individuals. Since we lack a mechanism by which to separate real
privacy lovers from high-risk individuals, then there will always be a pooling problem. The
introduction of BTTs causes inefficiencies for privacy lovers and also creates a social risk where
more people are pushed out of the insurance market altogether. The solution to this pooling
problem and the problem of the uninsured is to eliminate the ability of consumers to opt-out of
the BTT program. However this solution makes the privacy concern even worse. Hence, the
introduction of BTTs creates an inexorable tradeoff between privacy and efficiency.
What this analysis reveals is that the decision by others to opt-in to the behavioral tracking
systems is not an isolated choice, but also has an effect on the costs of privacy to other in-
dividuals. As more people opt-in to these systems, the cost for preserving privacy increases for
everyone else. Privacy is supposedly the quintessential “private good,” but it might turn out that
each individual’s personal decision to relinquish it may pose a greater social cost than the private
benefit accrued to that person. Each privacy surrender moves us closer to a society in which the
default price of a good is determined by the aggregate risk-factor of those who have given up
their privacy interests. That higher default price in turn raises the cost of personal privacy for
everyone else. This ratcheting effect may make the cost of valuing privacy so high that privacy
itself is priced out of the market.
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